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Abstract. In the 1990s, Richard Lewontin referred to what appeared to be the 
twilight of determinism in biology. He pointed out that DNA determines only 
a little part of life phenomena, which are very complex. In fact, organisms 
determine the environment and vice versa in a nonlinear way. Very recently, 
biophysicists, Shimon Marom and Erez Braun, have demonstrated that 
controlled biophysical systems have shown a relative autonomy and flexibility 
in response which could not be predicted. Within the boundaries of some 
restraints, most of them genetic, this freedom from determinism is well 
maintained. Marom and Braun have challenged not only biophysical 
determinism but also reverse-engineering, naive reductionism, mechanism, 
and systems biology.  
 
 
Metaphysically possibly, anything actual is contingent.
1
 Of course, such a 
possibility is entirely excluded in Spinoza’s philosophy as well as in 
many philosophical views at present. Kant believed that anything 
phenomenal, namely, anything that is experimental or empirical, is 
inescapably subject to space, time, and categories (such as causality) 
which entail the undeniable validity of determinism. Both Kant and 
Laplace assumed that modern science, such as Newton’s physics, must 
rely upon such a deterministic view. According to Kant, free will is 
possible not in the phenomenal world, the empirical world in which we 
                                                 
1 This is an assumption of a full-blown metaphysics—panenmentalism—whose 
author is Amihud Gilead. See Gilead 1999, 2003, 2009 and 2011, including literary, 
psychological, and natural applications and examples —especially in chemistry —in 
Gilead 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014a–c, and 2015a–d. 
2 
 
exist and which is fully deterministic, but only in the noumenal— the 
morally rational realm—in which we are free not to follow our emotions 
and instincts but only the moral, absolute law whose legislator is solely 
our reason. In contrast, according to Spinoza—who completely excluded 
the possibility of free will—contingency is only a matter of our 
ignorance; whenever we know the causes that are relevant to any change, 
we know for sure, quite adequately, that it does not happen contingently.  
 Many believed that each of the natural sciences demonstrates that 
empirical reality, perhaps the only reality in which we can live, is 
deterministic, as nothing happens contingently, as everything is subject to 
strict causality (quantum mechanics makes no exception). This holds true 
not only for all physical, chemical, and biological ordinary phenomena 
but also for chaotic ones. Chaotic phenomena—those phenomena whose 
equilibrium is extremely sensitive to the tiniest difference in the initial 
conditions and hence is unstable—are subject to mathematical equations. 
Thus, even though we cannot make weather forecasts for a long period 
but only for the next three or four days, any weather prediction is subject 
to simple mathematical equations. Hence, such chaotic phenomena are 
deterministic.  
 One can agree that when astronomical phenomena are concerned, 
determinism appears to have quite a solid ground (some will doubt even 
this). However, what about biology? Is life, its very existence, subject to 
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determinism, even subject to it at all? Think of Darwinism—there are 
evolutionary laws but all evolutionary changes cannot escape the 
contingency of circumstances that are not biological, genetically or 
otherwise. Nevertheless, also in this case, one can take a Spinozistic 
stance and argue that all this “contingency” is nothing but our ignorance 
about these circumstances in which, too, nothing happens contingently.  
 Though panenmentalist metaphysics leaves necessity only to the 
realm of individual pure possibility, actual-physical reality is contingent 
only, even though any actuality is an incomplete actualization of an 
individual pure possibility (see Gilead’s panenmentalist publications 
mentioned above). For a clarifying analogy, think of purely mathematical 
entities. These entities or objects yield to a strict logico-mathematical 
necessity, which is a priori, and, yet, the case appears to be that these 
entities or objects and their necessary relations are actualized 
contingently only as physical actualities. Nothing could enforce them as 
necessary on actual reality. May we demonstrate this to be the case in 
biological phenomena, too? Is such the case in these phenomena not 
because of our ignorance but because it is so in fact, quite independent of 
our knowledge? 
 In the 1990s, discussing biological phenomena, Richard Lewontin 
(1995 and 2000) argued that their major parts did not yield to 
determinism, especially those associated with genetics. Life phenomena 
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are most complex, and genetics plays a role in them but not a crucial or 
major one. The interrelations between any organism and its environment 
are even more critical. Lewontin writes: 
 
Even the organism does not compute itself from its DNA. A living organism 
at any moment in its life is the unique consequence of a development history 
that results from the interaction of and determination by internal and external 
forces. . . . Organisms do not find the world in which they develop. They 
make it.  . . .  Nor is “internal” identical with “genetic”.  . . . The variation 
between sides is a consequence of random cellular movements and chance 
molecular events within cells during development, so-called “developmental 
noise”. It is this same developmental noise that accounts for the fact that 
identical twins have different fingerprints and that the fingerprints on our left 
and right hands are different. . . . The scientists writing about the Genome 
Project explicitly reject an absolute genetic determinism, but they seem to be 
writing more to acknowledge theoretical possibilities than out of conviction.  . 
. . we cannot really believe that the sequence of the human genome is the grail 
that will reveal to us what it is to be human. (Lewontin 1995, pp. 61–62; cf. 
2000, p. 120) 
 
 
Following the knowable and wise advice of Lewontin, biology should not 
dispense of contingency, unpredictability, and indeterminism—all which 
are inevitable for knowing and understanding biology as it really is.
 What really matters, according to such a view, is the flexibility to 
operate without a “program”; it is the capability of accommodating 
unforeseen challenges (to use Braun’s phrase for it).  
 Indeed, two biophysicists, Shimon Marom and Erez Braun from 
the Technion at Haifa, Israel, have clearly demonstrated that a population 
of microorganisms (such as yeast) and a population of neurons are not 
subject to determinism, let alone to a strict one; instead, such populations 
demonstrate degrees of spontaneity and freedom which are unpredictable 
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in two senses—reversible and progressive (Braun and Marom 2015; 
Braun 2015). Such spontaneity and freedom are limited by some initial 
conditions but not by any sort of determinism, let alone a strict one. 
Implying much philosophical significance, this enlightening novelty does 
not ignore genetics, but it certainly shows that there are pure possibilities 
that are open to such systems of organisms and which are actualized in a 
contingent, or at least, indeterministic ways.  
 In a new, exciting and enlightening book, Marom shows that this 
kind of freedom and indeterminism is valid for the states and activity of 
our brain (Marom 2015). Marom and Braun’s scientific findings 
challenge the philosophies of systems biology (especially in rendering 
organisms, first of all our brain, as subject to mathematical models 
regardless of the environment in which our brain exists and operates), 
reductionist reverse-engineering, determinism, mechanism, and 
functionalism.
2
 It is a pity that about 27 years since Hilary Putnam’s 
philosophical candid and admired confession, that even though he was an 
ardent functionalist in the 1970s, since 1988 he has relinquished 
functionalism entirely (compare Putnam 1977 to Putnam 1988). Marom 
                                                 
2
  For a reductionist approach to psychology and natural science, one of which is 
biology, reducing the macro-reality to the physical micro-reality, see Hemmo and 
Shenker 2015, explicitly mentioning the “determinism at the fundamental mechanical 
level” (ibid., p. 6). Such a deterministic view is quite prevalent nowadays. Note that 
Hemmo and Shenker do not refer to neurons or cells but to quantum mechanics, thus 
the reductionism they have in mind is quite complicated and much more fundamental 
than the alternative physicalist views.  
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points to the major deficiency of functionalism in a most beautiful 
example (Marom 2015, p. 29–30): Garry Kasparov’s complaint that chess 
players start to imitate the Deep Blue computer instead of relying upon 
their insights and ingenuity (which reminds me of the famous scene in 
Chaplin’s Modern Times).  
 I am convinced that Marom and Braun’s challenge is well 
established and should not be dismissed or ignored.  
 Though some philosophers of science have challenged the 
indeterministic interpretation of Braun and Marom’s findings (see Carrier 
and Hon 2015), I believe that these philosophers have demonstrated a 
dogmatic, even a blind attitude, which refuses to learn anything new from 
established scientists, just because their novel discoveries are not 
compatible with the dogmatic assumptions of such philosophers. It is not 
in my intention to explicate my detailed counter-arguments to their 
criticism but, instead, to do my job as a philosopher and metaphysician, 
namely, to analyze open-mindedly the philosophical significance of these 
biophysical findings instead of criticizing them simply on a dogmatic 
basis. It is the job of natural scientists to put such findings to test, not of 
philosophers. It is a pity that those philosophers who criticizing Marom 
and Braun on some philosophical grounds, simply forgot or ignored the 
great Humean lesson that even though Newtonian physics was 
incompatible with Hume’s empiricism regarding his criticism of 
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necessary connections such as causality, Hume never doubted the great 
achievements of Newtonian physics. The adequate scientific test is most 
of all empirical. Philosophers are not allowed to criticize natural science 
merely on philosophical grounds. Philosophers should not consider 
themselves as methodologists of natural sciences nor critics of it. They 
should be students of science to the extent that empirical conclusions or 
theoretical ones are concerns. In contrast, the case appears to be that the 
philosophical group at Konstanz,
3
 who criticized Marom and Braun, 
simply forgot what philosophers should do in studding a new scientific 
approach. Out of a philosophical self-assurance or dogmatism, which has 
not much to do with candid and open-minded philosophy, they appear to 
react like dogmatic clerics, blind to facts and fresh innovative scientific 
ideas. 
 In an opposite way, I find some major similarities between 
panenmentalism and Marom and Braun’s biological approach. Marom 
writes: “Analyses in terms of relational dynamics with the environment . . 
.  are doomed to fail in the short term because . . . they are too general 
and not obviously applicable, they are romantic and abstract, and their 
proponents are willing to accept the impossible as valid no less than the 
possible” (Marom 2015, p. 174). It is quite easy to translate this into 
                                                 
3 Namely, Carrier and Hon 2015, Bechtel 2015, Green 2015, and Krohs (2015). 
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panenmentalist terms thus: instead of “actually impossible” 
panenmentalist mentions “purely possible” that is quite valid. 
Furthermore, Braun’s “contribution . . . to active protection against 
biological determinism” (ibid.)4 is certainly compatible with the 
panenmentalist conclusion that empirical reality in general and the 
biological one in particular are not deterministic, as anything actual is 
contingent. Panenmentalism leaves necessity only to the realm of 
individual pure possibilities and their relationality (namely, the ways in 
which they relate to each other). Equally, applied mathematics deals with 
contingency, for there is no reason that one of the mathematical pure 
possibilities should be actualized instead of another one, whereas in each 
of the fields of pure mathematics necessity inescapably prevails.  
 As for Braun’s insightful conclusions from his experiments with 
yeast, conclusions that are valid also for the formation of cancer, he 
writes: “In the language based on the lessons from our yeast experiments 
. . . in the context of differentiation, the cell realizes its basic potential 
once triggered into an exploratory mode; within the broad spectrum of 
possible realizations, parallel to differentiated states in normal 
developmental trajectories there are other trajectories that lead to 
                                                 
4
 Cf. the following: “The genotype, notwithstanding its important role, participates in 
the process but does not fully determine it. The genome in this view provides a set of 
constraints on the spectrum of regulatory modes, analogous to boundary conditions in 
physical dynamical systems” (Braun 2015, p. 44; italics are mine). 
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cancer” (Braun 2015, p. 41; italics are mine).5 Simply replace the word 
“potential” by “individual pure possibility”, and you traverse the line 
distinguishing natural science and panenmentalism as a metaphysics. It is 
simply a matter of translation—translating the natural scientific findings 
and insights into metaphysical insights, concepts, and explanations.  
 Note that Amihud Gilead discovered and was aware of all the 
natural scientific applications or correlates of panenmentalism, after, 
never before, he had originated and elaborated on this metaphysics. The 
first panenmentalist application was to consider the chemical elements, 
including the eka-elements, in the periodic table as the upshot of the 
attempt to exhaust all chemical pure possibilities. Gilead realized this 
application only after the publication of his first panenmentalist work 
(Gilead 1999) while writing the second panenmentalist book (Gilead 
2003, see pp. 65–70). Not before 2012, did Gilead discover the second 
application, that of the quasicrystals, to which an exclusion of vital 
crystalline pure possibilities had preceded by Pauling and his many 
followers. Gilead discovered this major and most interesting application 
                                                 
 
5 Cf. “every cell has the potential to adapt via multiple heterogeneous processes” 
(op.cit. p. 40) and “The point in cancer is that in the context of the adult organism, 
initiating stemness and novel trajectories of differentiation may lead to disastrous 
consequences in an inappropriate context while in the evolutionary context it serves 
as a potential for innovation and facilitates evolvability” (op. cit., p. 41). In each of 
these cases, saving possibilities—a panenmentalist credo and the title of the first 
panenmentalist book (Gilead 1999)—plays in fact a major role. 
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only after the publication of his fourth panenmentalist book (in 2011). 
The same holds for some other revolutionary discoveries in chemistry, 
physics, and biology to which he devoted some of his papers. The same 
holds true for the findings of Marom and Braun, to which he has become 
familiar only very recently. 
 How is it possible that a metaphysician, a philosopher who relies 
upon a priori considerations and entertains pure possibilities and their 
relationality, had discovered the relevant pure possibilities of these 
scientific, empirical discoveries? The reason is that philosophers, poets, 
authors, artists, mathematicians, as well as natural scientists all have 
some access to the realm of pure possibilities. They do not necessarily 
need to create models to make their actual discoveries, they need their 
reasoning and especially imagination to have access to the realm of pure 
possibilities, which, unlike empirical facts, are not accessible by relying 
upon experience and observations. Pure possibilities, by definition, are 
not empirically observable or discoverable. In the same manner, 
Platonists in the field of the philosophy of mathematics refer to the 
imagination and reasoning of mathematicians as legitimate means to have 
access to the realm of the entities or objects of pure mathematics. As 
much as philosophers may open our eyes to pure possibilities that we 
have never encountered as actualities, dogmatic philosophers may 
attempt to close such possibilities for us. In fact, such was the manner 
11 
 
that the above-mentioned Konstanz group of philosophers of science had 
treated the innovations of Marom and Braun. 
 The following is a crucially important passage: 
. . . protein fluctuations do not reflect any specific molecular or cellular 
mechanism, and suggest that some buffering process masks these details and 
induces universality . . .  In the neural system, the same feature is manifested 
in long-term single neuron and neuronal population excitability dynamics, 
which are unstable and dominated by critical fluctuations, intermittency, 
scale-invariant rate statistics, and long memory processes. . . .  Physics teaches 
us that such broad, universal distributions that emerge in different systems and 
scales, require either fine tuning of control parameters ‘engineered’ to lock the 
system in specific (but rare) points in phase space (this is then a critical point), 
or a capacity of the system to tune itself to hover around such a point, 
irrespective of control parameters (a process coined self-organized criticality). 
(Braun and Marom 2015, p. 3)  
 
Referring to a capacity of the system to tune itself to hover around such a 
critical point is a new, overwhelming voice in biophysics. 
Mechanisticness, computabilism, functionalism, and most notably 
determinism, ignoring the inter-relationality of complex systems and 
environment, should not be considered from now on as suitable or 
adequate in order to learn and understand such biophysical systems. 
Indeed, thanks to Marom and Braun’s novel view, “the path towards 
complexity is wide open” (ibid.). Hence,  
 
it turns out that the microorganism system can adapt to unforeseen challenges 
within a few generations, practically instantaneous in evolution terms; 
moreover, the rapidly emerging adapted state is stably inherited . . .   This is 
analogous to the facts of fast learning and memory in humans and other 
organisms, attributed to whole brain mechanisms. Such rapid adaptations, 
learning and memory that seemingly break efficacy limits imposed by the 
dimensionality of the problems, are also observed in our large-scale neuronal 
networks. . . .  The above examples of microscopic-macroscopic degeneracy 
of observables led us, in Konstanz, to reflect on the possible indeterminacy 
entailed by the combination of many-to-one and one-to-many relations among 
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levels of organization: Regardless of the level one chooses to analyze, the 
extent to which observables from that analyzed level determine the 
phenomenology at other levels, seems limited. We suspect that one possible 
origin of the above microscopic-macroscopic degeneracy is related to our 
(experimentalists) habitual isolation of parts from the whole in standard 
experimental praxis. Biological systems under natural conditions are 
embedded in environments, which are in themselves dynamical entities that 
mould the—and are coupled to—many levels of system organization, from 
the single cell to the whole organism and population of organisms. 
Disconnecting the system’s dynamics from the dynamics or statistics of the 
environment, might lead to erroneous classification of system’s phenomena. A 
demonstration of the latter point involves the interpretation of neuronal 
response variability under different environmental statistics. . . . While the 
exposure of universals is a most significant aspect of biological research (e.g. 
DNA, cell structure, energy production and consumption, etc.), much of 
biology is about specificity, telling the origins of differences between species, 
phenomena, and capacities. . . .  it implies that the search for the relevant 
system variables should become the most important and urgent for the 
advancement of biology. Without identification of the relevant variables, the 
practice of experimental biology becomes a fishing expedition, dictated by 
fashion and technological barriers. As demonstrated below, reverse 
engineering of biological systems constitutes an example for going amiss 
upon lack of well defined relevant system variables. (op. cit., pp. 3–4; the 
italics are mine) 
 
 In this way, Marom and Braun have opened new, revolutionary 
possibilities, at least for biophysics. A panenmentalist approach can serve 
them, as well as scientists like them, as a philosophical platform or frame 
for their fruitful research whose future is certainly still ahead of the 
present era. Especially because of biases, prejudices, and dogmatism, 
some of which, unfortunately, have had some philosophical support. 
Panenmentalism aims at saving pure possibilities, which are vital for our 
knowledge, conduct of life, the progress of natural sciences, or the very 
existence of arts. Pure possibilities are essential for our capability to use 
our imagination and creativity, which has to do with one of our special 
feature—neoteny—which mainly consists of our playing or entertaining 
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with pure possibilities (Gilead 2015d). Following Donald Wood 
Winnicott’s view of playing, we are well aware how vital is the role that 
it plays in scientific creativity and discoveries, no less than in philosophy 
and the arts. Panenmentalism may serve as a conceptual frame or 
philosophical basis for Marom and Braun’s scientific innovations not 
only in saving new scientific pure possibilities that the mainstream of 
biophysics has neglected so far or even has closed or excluded, but also 
in regarding actual-physical reality as contingent, hence in rejecting or, at 
least, drastically mitigating determinism to the extent that biology is 
concerned. Panenmentalism also gives strong support to their innovations 
by rejecting reductionism that is not naive (to use their term). 
Panenmentalism clearly explicates the difference of categories between 
pure possibility and its physical actuality (physical in the broad sense of 
the term, i.e., strictly physical, material, chemical, biochemical, or 
biological). Pure possibilities are absolutely exempt from spatiotemporal 
and causal conditions as well as from any physical properties, whereas 
actualities inescapably yield to spatiotemporal and causal conditions as 
well as to physical properties. For instance, actualities (namely, actual 
entities) have mass or weight, they have a shape or figure, have color, 
size, dimensions, temperature, chemical properties, and the like, whereas 
pure possibilities are exempt from all these. Because actualities are thus 
caterorially different from their essential pure possibilities (which 
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determine the identity of these actualities), they are entirely irreducible to 
each other. Furthermore, according to panenmentalism, biological 
entities, which actualize biological pure possibilities, are irreducible to 
physical entities, which actualize physical pure possibilities (as their 
identities) or to chemical or biochemical entities, which actualize 
chemical or biochemical pure possibilities (as their identities). Thus, 
organisms—biological entities—which actualize biological pure 
possibilities, are irreducible to physical, chemical, or biochemical pure 
possibilities. Each actuality actualized its own pure identity-possibility, 
not that of another actuality. All these pure possibilities are discoverable 
by means of the theory in each of the relevant scientific fields. If, because 
of a dogmatic attitude, some of these essential possibilities are excluded, 
the scientific progress is blocked and scientists could not identify new, 
so-far unfamiliar, phenomena and could not be able to identify them. In 
all of these senses, panenmentalism sets the conceptual frame or the 
philosophical-metaphysical basis for new scientific ideas such as those of  
Marom and Braun. 
 The time is ripe to relinquish in some natural sciences, such as 
biology, the deterministic nature that Kant and Laplace ascribed to all 
natural phenomena. If such is the case in biophysics, all the more so is the 
case in biology in general. At least in biology in general and brain studies 
in particular, despite the prevailing of main stream reverse engineering, 
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functionalism, computabilism, and mechanism,
6
 the twilight of 
determinism begins to raise its much promising head. 
 A good philosophy of science should be an analytical and detailed 
reflection on scientific novelties, discoveries, and progress; it should 
never take upon itself the task of a mentor, compass, or regulator. Such is 
the manner that suits religious tendencies or, worse, politically 
totalitarian, not of a genuine, good philosophy. It is about time to liberate 
our ideas of natural science from such a dogmatism that such group of 
philosophers of science in Konstanz have, most unfortunately, 
demonstrated. Indeed, “the multitude of possible mappings exposes the 
inherent difficulty of reverse engineering – that is, its indeterminacy” (op. 
cit., p.4), as complexity is indispensable for biology; complexity is the 
special nature of biological systems. 
 Molecular biology, with the grand ambitions of James Watson and 
Francis Crick, has followed the wrong approach that all the biological 
phenomena lay on the basis of the DNA structure and its ramifications. 
This has turned out to be a fantasy, and a very misleading one. Braun and 
Marom offer biologists a paradigm-change, a revolution in theoretical 
                                                 
6 Indeed, “unlike technology, the business of biology as a basic science is not to 
uncover a plausible mechanism but rather to discover the actual design principles 
underlying the natural phenomenon; this is where the naive version of reverse 
engineering in particular, and naive reductionism in general, epistemically fails” (op. 
cit., p. 4). This is a firm philosophical reflection and not only a wise natural scientific 
guideline. 
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biology. It is very sad to realize that of all scholars some philosophers are 
entirely blind to this promising and welcome novel, even revolutionary, 
shift. 
 I would like to end this paper by citing the most important 
following promising hope: 
 
Notwithstanding the impressive advance in molecular biology, the last 50 
years have taught us that progress in understanding biology, which is not 
synonymous with progress in medical applications, is severely impeded by the 
reductionist approach, focusing solely on cataloguing an ever increasing list of 
molecular processes, without a complementary effort in unraveling the 
system-level organization principles. What seems to be missing is indeed a 
unifying concept of organization. . . . The current multi-disciplinary effort is 
still on, so it might be too early to judge. However, until now it has not yet 
developed an original view, raising its own voice regarding the origin, 
evolution and development of biological systems as natural phenomena, 
independent of the tyranny of the molecular approach. (Braun 2015, p. 45)  
 
 
As a philosopher and metaphysician, I whole-heartedly welcome this 
hope. I look forward to witnessing “a shift in conceptual thinking from 
molecular causations to a problem of organization” (Braun 2015, p.38).7 
Such conceptual thinking is of great interest to open-minded philosophers 
and scientists as well. It is about time for open-minded philosophers not 
to follow a reductionistic approach and the old-fashioned tyranny of the 
                                                 
7  Cf. the “paradigm shift” in the study of cancer: “putting the environment context 
and history of the cells at central stage while moving genes backstage” (Braun 2015, 
p. 39); “a shift from the somatic mutation picture to developmental-organizational 
perspective” (op.cit., p. 40). It is very interesting and enlightening to compare this 
conception cancer with that of Aktipis et al. 2015. 
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molecular approach in biology. It is about time to reconsider to what 
extent, if at all, determinism is valid at least for the biosciences.   
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